Stalnaker (1984): “The beliefs of a perfectly rational intelligence could be represented by a single belief state.”
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Egan (2008):
Stalnaker (1984): “The beliefs of a perfectly rational intelligence could be represented by a single belief state.”

Egan (2008): “...while an absolutely ideal believer will both (a) have completely reliable methods of belief-formation, and (b) incorporate all of their reliably-obtained information about the world into a single unified corpus of beliefs that’s active in guiding all of their behavior all of the time, we shouldn’t think that it’s a good idea to have the second feature in the absence of the first.”
**Anti-Fragmentation**: For any fragmented state, there’s a non-fragmented state that is more epistemically ideal.
Anti-Fragmentation: For any fragmented state, there’s a non-fragmented state that is more epistemically ideal.
Anti-Fragmentation: For any fragmented state, there’s a non-fragmented state that is more epistemically ideal.

Fragmented concept possession is epistemically ideal.
Plan

I. Fragmented Concept Possession
   Modelling Fragmented Information Access
   Extending the Model to Concepts

II. Why It’s Ideal
   Costs and Benefits of Possessing Concepts
   Getting the Benefits without the Costs

III. Consequences & Extensions
   Defective Concepts
   Ideals of Coherence
   Non-Idealized Agents?
PART I
Fragmented Concept Possession
23-H? Ogden?

[that Ogden lives in 23-H]
23-H?  Ogden?

[that Ogden lives in 23-H]
23-H? Ogden? [that Ogden lives in 23-H] [that Jack lives in 34-C]
23-H?  Ogden?

[that Ogden lives in 23-H]

[that Jack lives in 34-C]
Jack’s information state:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elicitation Condition</th>
<th>Information accessible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recently asked “Where does Ogden live?”</td>
<td>Ogden lives in 23-H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[irrelevant information]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recently asked “Who lives in 23-H?”</td>
<td>[irrelevant information]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Split brain patient’s information state:
## Split brain patient’s information state:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elicitation Condition</th>
<th>Information Accessible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicate verbally</td>
<td>Picture is of shovel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicate with left hand</td>
<td>Picture is of chicken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Split-brain Jack’s information state:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elicitation Condition</th>
<th>Info</th>
<th>Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right visual field: who is in apartment 23-H?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Verbal reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right visual field: which apartment is Ogden in?</td>
<td>Ogden is in 23-H</td>
<td>Verbal reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left visual field: who is in apartment 23-H?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Left hand pointing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left visual field: which apartment is Ogden in?</td>
<td>Ogden is in 23-H</td>
<td>Left hand pointing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Elga and Rayo: fragmentation as indexing

Me: two-part indices
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elicitation Condition</th>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

A concept is ...
A concept is ... 

a mental particular?

an abstract object?

an ability to classify/infer/etc.?
A concept is . . .

a mental particular?

an abstract object?

an ability to classify/infer/etc.?

an ability to think a content.
23-Н?
23-H? vs.
RED, CHAIR

PRIME, NUMBER, LESS THAN 50
RED, CHAIR

PRIME, NUMBER, LESS THAN 50

RED + PRIME + NUMBER ?
PRIME + CHAIR + LESS THAN 50 ?
PART II
The Ideal of Concept Fragmentation
Adults: weight, density
Adults: weight, density

Children: weighnsity
Epistemic Empathy: attributing an attitude to someone by using the same concepts they use in having the attitude.
Why did block X rather than Y sink?
Why did block X rather than Y sink?

Child

\[
\begin{aligned}
X &\text{ is weighnsier;}
\end{aligned}
\]
Why did block X rather than Y sink?

**Child**

\[
\begin{aligned}
X & \text{ is weighnsier;} \\
X & \text{ is less clever;} \\
& \text{…}
\end{aligned}
\]
Why did block X rather than Y sink?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Child</th>
<th>Adult</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X is weighnsier;</td>
<td>X is more dense;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X is less clever;</td>
<td>X is heavier;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>X is less clever;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Why did block X rather than Y sink?

Child

\[\begin{align*}
X \text{ is weighnsier;} \\
X \text{ is less clever;} \\
\ldots
\end{align*}\]

Adult

\[\begin{align*}
X \text{ is more dense;} \\
X \text{ is heavier;} \\
X \text{ is less clever;} \\
\ldots
\end{align*}\]

Adult+

\[\begin{align*}
X \text{ is weighnsier;} \\
X \text{ is less clever;} \\
X \text{ is more dense;} \\
\ldots
\end{align*}\]
Should one have density or not?
DENSITY, WEIGHT, ...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elicitation</th>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[all conditions]</td>
<td>DENSITY</td>
<td>thinking about physical objects;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>interpreting DENSITY-users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[all conditions]</td>
<td>WEIGHNSITY</td>
<td>interpreting WEIGHNSITY-users</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What exactly is this ‘interpreting CONCEPT-users’ index?’
What exactly is this ‘interpreting CONCEPT-users’ index?

Consider belief.
Fragmented concept possession provides the epistemic benefits of possession without the costs.
Fragmented concept possession provides the epistemic benefits of possession without the costs.

So: Anti-Fragmentation
PART III
Consequences & Extensions
Defective concepts: tonk, Vulcan, slur concepts, . . . ?
Defective concepts: TONK, VULCAN, slur concepts, . . . ?

Mere possession is neutral?
Defective concepts: tonk, Vulcan, slur concepts, . . .?

Mere possession is neutral?

No. It has both costs and benefits.
Defective concepts: *tonk, Vulcan, slur concepts, . . . ?*

Mere possession is neutral?

No. It has both costs and benefits.

Fragmented possession is ideal.
Ideals of coherence?
Ideals of coherence?

Depends…
Ideals of coherence?

Depends…

Worsnip (2018)-style coherence?
Ideals of coherence?

Depends…


Coherence as states ‘fitting together’?
Ideals of coherence?

Depends…


Coherence as states ‘fitting together’? Sure.
What about for non-idealized agents?
What about for non-idealized agents?

Some additional pros and cons:
What about for non-idealized agents?

Some additional pros and cons:
What about for non-idealized agents?

Some additional pros and cons:
I extended fragmentation to concept possession,
I extended fragmentation to concept possession,

argued that fragmented access to concepts can be ideal,
I extended fragmentation to concept possession,

argued that fragmented access to concepts can be ideal,

and pointed out a few ways this might matter.
I extended fragmentation to concept possession,

argued that fragmented access to concepts can be ideal,

and pointed out a few ways this might matter.

Thanks!