Hi, I'm Mike Deigan, a philosophy PhD student at Yale. I have broad interests, but mostly work on language and ethics, trying to answer questions like “What does the word ‘a’ mean?” and “How should we live?”.

Below are some papers I've written, as well as slides and handouts for talks.

Comments/questions are welcome!



  • Counterfactual Double Lives
    (2017) Proceedings of the 21st Amsterdam Colloquium, pp. 215-224.
    Edited by A. Cremers, T. van Gessel, & F. Roelofsen.
    // PAPER (pdf)

    We sometimes lead double lives in the consequents of counterfactuals. In counteridenticals like 'If I were you, I would like me.', 'I' and 'me' seem to pick out different individuals. This, I argue, is a problem for the orthodox Kripke-Kaplan view of indexicals as rigid designators, a view which requires 'I' and 'me' to have the same referent in all worlds of evaluation.

    I show this problem is not limited to counteridenticals, but also appears in 'ordinary' counterfactuals like "If I were a policeman, I would arrest me." and modal subordination, as in "I could have been a policeman. I would have arrested me for what I just did." So the problem cannot be solved by a special treatment of counteridenticals. Nor, I argue, can it be analyzed as involving descriptive indexicals. Instead, we should make a more dramatic fix, such as moving to counterpart theory for de re modal ascriptions.

  • Counterfactual Donkeys Don't Get High
    (2018) Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 22, pp. 367--384.
    Edited by Uli Sauerland and Stephanie Solt.
    // PAPER (pdf)

    I present data that suggest the universal entailments of counterfactual donkey sentences aren't as universal as some (Van Rooij (2005) and Walker and Romero (2015)) have claimed. I argue that this favors the strategy of attributing the universal entailments to a special property of the similarity ordering on worlds provided by some contexts, rather than to a semantically encoded sensitivity to assignment.

  • Paper on truthmaker semantics
    Under review (email me for draft)
  • Paper on the ethics of offsetting
    Under review (email me for draft)
  • Stupefying
    In preparation
    // (email me for draft)

    Sometimes when someone says something, we don't understand what it means, but nevertheless go along with it and signal acceptance. I argue that this phenomenon, which I call ‘stupefying’, is both practically important and theoretically interesting. Unlike the backdoor, non-at-issue content-based mechanisms emphasized by Langton, Stanley, and others, stupefying is a means of conversationally short-circuiting rational deliberation which can rely entirely on at-issue meaning.

    Modelling and understanding stupefying, then, is a worthwhile endeavor. I try to make some headway on this in the remainder of the paper by extending some tools developed by Yalcin (2016 and elsewhere) and Bledin and Rawlins (2016).

  • Paper on the metaphysics of value
    Under review (email me for draft)


  • Counterfactual Double Lives
    at the 2017 Amsterdam Colloquium (slides)
  • Truthmaker semantics talk
    at NASSLLI 2018 (poster) // at the 2017 Workshop on Hyperintensional Logics and Semantics, Ghent University (handout)
  • Counterfactual Donkeys Don't Get High
    at SuB 2017 (slides) // at Champollion's Spring 2017 class, NYU (handout)
  • Offsetting talk
    at Yale WIP, Fall 2016 (handout)
  • Partiality and Preferring What's Best
    at 2015 Oxford Grad Conference (handout)